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OIL & GAS SURVEY: WEST VIRGINIA
Joshua P. Fershee*
This Article summarizes and discusses important recent
developments in West Virginia’s oil and gas law as determined by
recent West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cases. There were no
substantial legislative changes in the current period.
I. ANDREWS V. ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION
In Andrews v. Antero Res. Corp., Antero Resources
Corporation (“Antero”) derived leasehold rights to develop mineral
resources in Harrison County, West Virginia, through a severance
deed.1 The severance deed was executed in the early 1900s and listed
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1. 828 S.E.2d 858, 861 (W. Va. 2019).
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certain rights, including the right to drill, bore, and operate oil and gas
wells.2
The Petitioners represented holders of the surface rights on
properties near Antero’s drilling activities and alleged that Antero’s
mineral operations interfered with the Petitioners use and enjoyment
of the land.3 Specifically, the Petitioners pointed to the annoyance,
inconvenience, and discomfort caused by heavy equipment, diesel
fumes, and other emissions from traffic, and there was no allegation
of property damage.4 The Petitioners asserted that the operator did not
have the right to extract natural gas using methods like horizonal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, which were not contemplated when
the severance deeds were executed in the 1900s.5 Further, they
asserted, even where the drilling operations were located off-site of
the Petitioners’ surface estate, Antero had substantially interfered with
the Petitioners’ use and enjoyment of their surface estate.6
Under West Virginia law, the owner of mineral rights
possesses the right to use the surface in a manner and with such means
as would be fairly necessary for the enjoyment of the mineral estate.7
However, for an owner of mineral resources to access an implied
easement for surface rights, it must be demonstrated not only that the
right is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the mineral, but also
that the right can be exercised without substantial burden to the surface
owner.8
In this case, Antero’s off-site horizontal drilling operations did
not cause any substantial burden because Antero was within its rights
to use the surface land to access the minerals below.9 The court,
consistent with prior rulings, determined that building roads and well
pads and drilling wells was reasonably necessary for the extraction of
natural gas.10 Although horizontal drilling was not envisioned at the
time of deed formation (mineral owners only anticipated the impacts
of vertical drilling), expert testimony revealed that horizontal drilling
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 865.
Id.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.
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has less of a surface impact than traditional vertical drilling.11
Furthermore, because the drilling operations were located off-site of
the Petitioners’ surface estates, the claim was even more attenuated.12
This case further confirms that under West Virginia law, both
horizontal and vertical drilling operations constitute surface use in a
manner reasonably necessary to extract natural gas.13
II. KUPFER V. CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, LLC
In Kupfer v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the Kupfers
received ninety acres of land by deed in 1980.14 The deed did not
contain any oil and gas reservations. In 1990, the Kupfers conveyed
eight parcels of land, plus an additional 60-acre parcel (the “ninth
parcel”) to Michael Blair.15 The Petitioners’ deed stated that the eight
parcels were excepted and reserved from all coal, oil, gas, and other
minerals, thus retaining those mineral rights from the eight parcels.16
That deed later described the “ninth parcel” but made no reference to
any reservations or exceptions as to the mineral rights.17
In September 2000, Michael Blair conveyed his interest in the
ninth parcel to Zachary Blair using exactly the same language as the
1990 deed.18 In 2009, Zachary Blair leased the oil and gas resources
to Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, which then sold and assigned the
lease in 2014 to the current rights holder, SWN Production
Company.19 The language of the 1990 deed was preserved in
subsequent conveyances, explicitly reserving and excepting the oil
and gas resources for the eight parcels and separately referencing to
the “ninth parcel” without mentioning a reservation.20 In 2016, the
Petitioners filed a complaint of trespass and conversion against the
respondents claiming that they owned the oil and gas rights associated

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 869.
Id.
Id.
No. 17-0527, 2018 WL 2175553, at *1 (W. Va. May 11, 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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with the “ninth parcel,” asserting that those rights were also reserved
in the 1990 deed.21
The Kupfers argued that “[a] deed of conveyance, in order to
pass title, must contain a description of the property being conveyed
which sufficiently identifies the land, either by the language of the
granting clause itself or by reference to extrinsic facts which render
the description certain.”22 Additionally, they argued that the subject
deed provided lists of the parcels to be conveyed early in the
document, and that language “completed the conveyance.”23 They
further claimed that additional descriptions of the individual parcels
appearing later in the deed were not needed.24 Therefore, they claimed
that if the later “unnecessary parcel by parcel description is removed,”
the remaining deed language was sufficient to identify what was
conveyed, reserving and excepting oil and gas rights for all parcels,
including the ninth parcel.25
The court disagreed, stating that “Petitioners’ argument is
fundamentally flawed in that it focuses on but one portion of the
subject deed and fails to consider all of the parts together so as to give
effect to the intention of the parties.”26 The court further explained, “it
is axiomatic that ‘[p]arties are bound by general and ordinary
meanings of words used in deeds.’”27
Under West Virginia law, in order to pass title, a deed of
conveyance must contain a description of the property being conveyed
that sufficiently identifies the land, either by the language of the grant
clause itself or by reference to extrinsic facts that render description
certain. Here, the deed contained a distinct description of parcels one
through eight and includes language regarding the oil and gas
reservations. However, the “ninth parcel” is described in a separate
portion of the document, and the description is silent on oil and gas
reservations. In this case, the court determined that the deed did not
21. Id.
22. Id. at *3 (quoting Sally-Mike Props. v. Yokum, 332 S.E.2d 597, 602 (W. Va.
1985)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at *6–7.
25. Id. at *7.
26. Id. at *8.
27. Id. at *10. (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, McDonough Co. v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours
& Co., Inc., 280 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1981); Syl. Pt. 1, Meadows v. Belknap, 483
S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1997)).
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reserve or except any coal, oil, or gas. As such, the Petitioners do not
own the parcel of land, and therefore lack standing to bring forth any
claim.
III. EQT PRODUCTION CO. V. CROWDER
A. Facts
Margot Beth Crowder and David Wentz own surface land
(“Crowder Land”) that had been part of a larger tract of land in
Doddridge County, West Virginia. The mineral rights of that land
were leased in 1901 to a predecessor of EQT Production Company
(“EQT”) to drill for oil and gas. EQT drilled horizontal wells on the
Crowder Land surface that extended under neighboring properties and
to natural gas. In 2011, EQT sought to pool the rights provided under
the 1901 lease with other leases it held so it could drill and extract oil
and gas on neighboring lands. EQT obtained a pooling clause in a
modified deed in 2011 from the mineral owners but not from the
surface owners of Crowder and Wentz.
EQT then drilled horizontal wells on the Crowder Land, which
produced gas derived from neighboring properties. Crowder and
Wentz sued, claiming that EQT’s lease did not allow the company to
use the Crowder Land surface estate to extract oil and gas from
neighboring mineral estates. The lease did not have a pooling clause.
Instead, the lease only granted permission to extract oil and gas from
the mineral estate below the Crowder Land surface.
The Circuit Court of Doddridge County ruled in favor of
Crowder and Wentz and entered an order granting partial summary
judgment, finding that EQT trespassed when it used the Respondent’s
surface lands to conduct operations on neighboring properties. A jury
awarded $190,000 in damages. EQT brought this appeal.
The high court determined that mineral lessees have “an
implied right to use the surface of a tract in any way reasonable and
necessary to the development of minerals underlying the tract.”28 It is
worth noting that the court confirmed that the use of horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing is reasonable and necessary. However, the
court continued, “a mineral owner or lessee does not have the right to
28. EQT Prod. Co. v. Crowder, 828 S.E.2d 800, 801 (W. Va. 2019).
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use the surface to benefit mining or drilling operations on other lands,
in the absence of an express agreement with the surface owner
permitting those operations.”29
In addition, the court explained that the owners of the mineral
estate could not provide pooling rights to use the Crowder Land
because the mineral owners “no longer owned the right to use the
surface estate for exploration on and production from neighboring
tracts.”30 The mineral estate had been severed from the surface in
1936, meaning the pooling right “was a right attached to the surface
estate.”31
This decision could (and should) have the effect of overruling
a 2016 lower court decision. Back in April 2016, a West Virginia case
ruled that there was an implied right to pool in oil and gas leases.32
The EQT decision corrects this erroneous decision, which implied that
all oil and gas leases come with an implied right of pooling.33
IV. L&D INVESTMENTS, INC. V. MIKE ROSS, INC.
Charles Lee Andrews (“Charles”), as trustee for his mother,
Mary, held a fee simple title to two tracts of land.34 The surface land
was eventually divided among Mary’s descendants, and the oil and
gas wealth was conveyed to several different individuals.35 A real
29. Id.
30. Id. At 810.
31. Id.
32. There is an Implied Right to Pool an Oil and Gas Lease, Jackson Kelly LLC
Oil and Gas Update, https://oilandgas.jacksonkelly.com/2016/04/there-is-animplied-right-to-pool-an-oil-and-gas-lease.html (April 20, 2016) (discussing
American Energy-Marcellus LLC v. Poling, Circuit Court of Tyler County, West
Virginia, Civil Action No. 15-C-34 H).
33. See Joshua P. Fershee, Oil & Gas Survey: West Virginia, 5 TEX. A&M J.
PROP. L. 169 (2019); Taryn Phaneuf, Professor says judge’s opinion on implied
pooling rights marks departure from state oil and gas law, THE W. VA. REC. (Aug.
11,
2016),
https://wvrecord.com/stories/510990698-professor-says-judge-sopinion-on-implied-pooling-rights-marks-departure-from-state-oil-and-gas-law
[https://perma.cc/6SEA-JX8G]; Robert J. Burnett & William J. Blakemore, Pooling
Clause Not Necessary: West Virginia Court Finds Implied Right to Pool Exists
Where Lease Silent (May 25, 2016), https://www.hh-law.com/driller-may-have-animplied-right-to-pool-lease-where-no-pooling-clause-exists/
[https://perma.cc/HM55-C4SC] (“No court has ever recognized an implied covenant
to pool.”).
34. L&D Invs., Inc. v. Mike Ross, Inc., 818 S.E.2d 872, 875 (W. Va. 2018).
35. Id.
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property tax assessment for 100% of the oil and gas interests remained
solely in the name of Charles. Additional tax assessments were added
to the Harrison County land books in 1988.36 The assessment under
the “master assessment” in Charles’s name was paid each year through
1999.37
In 1999, several descendants claiming an interest in the oil and
gas rights requested separation of their respective interests from the
“master assessment.”38 The descendants paid their individual
assessments each year, but the master assessment was not paid starting
in 2000.39 The master assessment became delinquent, and a tax lien on
the property in the name of Charles was sold at a delinquent tax sale
to Mike Ross, Inc (“MRI”) in 2003.40 In 2013, L&D investments
(“Petitioners”) purchased oil and gas interests from two of Mary’s
decedents. L&D expected oil and gas royalties from the purchase but
then learned that MRI owned the assets through a delinquent tax sale.41
The circuit court granted summary judgment on the ground
that the Petitioners’ claims were barred by a three-year statute of
limitations.42 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
reversed, stating that “void tax sale deeds did not have a statute of
limitations.”43 The Court further found that the circuit court erred by
concluding that the petitioners’ ownership interests were “legitimately
sold out from under them.”44 Because of the double assessments and
the payment of the taxes by the Petitioners, the court determined that
the mineral interests were never delinquent, and the sale was void.45
V. STEAGER V. CONSOL ENERGY, INC.
Consol Energy, Inc., d/b/a CNX Gas Company, LLC
(“Consol”) and Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) own
multiple gas wells in several West Virginia counties.46 The
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 876.
Id.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 881.
Id.
Steager v. Consol Energy, Inc., 832 S.E.2d 135, 140 (W. Va. 2019).
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Respondents (Consol and Antero) are the owners of traditional and
horizontal gas wells.47 The gas wells are assessed for ad valorem taxes
based on a formula created by the West Virginia State Tax
Commissioner, Dale W. Steager.48 This case concerns the proper
valuation of operating expense deductions for horizontal and
traditional gas wells.49
Consol and Antero first claimed that the Tax Department
imposed a cap on operating expense deductions.50 The cap was
described as both a percentage (30% for vertical wells and 20% for
horizontal wells), and a monetary figure ($5,000 for vertical wells and
$150,000 for horizontal wells).51 The Court was asked to determine
whether the West Virginia Code allows for a cap placed on operating
expense deductions and if the cap can be described as both a
percentage and dollar figure.52
Additionally, Consol and Antero argued that the operating
expense deduction calculation, which did not include expenses
associated with gathering, processing, and transporting the gas,
resulted in an overvaluation of the gas wells.53 Finally, the Court
needed to decide whether a monetary average was the correct
calculation of operating expense deductions as opposed to an
unlimited percentage.54
The Court affirmed the business court’s finding that the use of
a “not to exceed” amount or “cap” on operating expense deductions
was not supported by the West Virginia Code § 110-1J 4.3.55 The cap
singled out wells with higher gross receipts, and thus the cap applied
a different percentage reduction for operating expenses. In doing so,
the cap allowed the Tax Department to treat higher grossing and lower
grossing wells differently and applied two different tax valuation
methods depending on the well.56 This was in violation of the West
Virginia Constitution Article X, Section 1 “equal and uniform”
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 142.
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requirement, as well as the equal protection provisions of the West
Virginia and United States Constitutions.57
Next, the Tax Department had restricted the definition of
operating expenses to only include costs relating to the maintenance
and production of gas.58 However, the Tax Department calculated
gross receipts at the point of sale, which they used to derive the tax on
the producers.59 The process of bringing gas to the point of sale
subjected producers to more operating expenses, including
transportation expenses.60 Energy producers were not allowed to
incorporate those transportation expenses in the operating expense
calculation, meaning that the tax deduction for operating expenses did
not include the total cost of bringing the gas to the market.61
The business court concluded that operating expenses should
include gathering, compressing, processing, and transporting
expenses; and the Supreme Court agreed. However, the business court
failed to provide a remedy on this issue, so the court determined that
the Tax Department’s interpretation that the regulation includes postproduction expenses as part of the annual industry average operating
expenses was correct.62
Lastly, the Court concluded that a monetary average was the
correct calculation for operating expenses, but that the monetary
average should not be calculated as an unlimited percentage deduction
for operating expenses.63 The Court found that the language of the
regulation plainly contemplated the use of a monetary average and not
percentages.64

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 151.
Id.

